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‘A log-rolling, Irish-American politician, out to raise votes in 
the United States’: Tip O’Neill and the Irish dimension of 
Anglo-American relations, 1977-1986 
Abstract 
The Irish dimension of Anglo-American relations is a relatively marginalised 
aspect of the historiography of transatlantic studies.  Historians have focused on the 
role of the Clinton administration in the Northern Ireland ‘peace process’ but previous 
American contributions also warrant attention.  As the Speaker of the United States 
House of Representatives, Thomas P. ‘Tip’ O’Neill was one of the most prominent 
Irish-American politicians.  This paper will demonstrate O’Neill’s attempts to ensure 
that the American contribution to the Anglo-Irish process steadily increased, despite 
the transition from arguably his natural political ally in the President Jimmy Carter 
administration to President Ronald Reagan in 1981.  O’Neill’s interest in Northern 
Ireland and position as speaker helped ensure that Carter’s promise of financial aid to 
Northern Ireland in 1977 following progress in the political process was fulfilled in 
March 1986. 
Introduction 
On 28 March 1979, Jim Callaghan’s Labour government narrowly lost a ‘no 
confidence’ debate in the House of Commons.  This defeat prompted a general 
election campaign that lasted for over a month.  On 3 May, Margaret Thatcher’s 
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Conservative Party won the election and she would remain prime minister for over 
eleven years.  The campaign was briefly interrupted by the visit of Thomas P. ‘Tip’ 
O’Neill, Jr. (D-MA) – the Speaker of the United States House of Representatives – to 
London as part of a Congressional delegation’s expedition to Europe, particularly the 
United Kingdom and Republic of Ireland (Ireland).  Due to the speaker’s keen interest 
in Northern Ireland, his meetings with senior British and Irish politicians were 
potentially controversial.  The controversy that emerged from O’Neill’s remarks 
about the attitude of the British government to Northern Ireland – as will be discussed 
below, he claimed that they treated Northern Ireland as a ‘political football’ – was 
bookended on the one hand by the promise of President Jimmy Carter in 1977 to offer 
financial assistance to Northern Ireland on condition that there was some success in 
the political process there, and the fulfilment of that pledge by the Reagan 
administration and Democrat-controlled U.S. Congress in 1986.   
 
The connection between American foreign and domestic policies is an 
established phenomenon, particularly the role of ethnic groups in the lobbying of 
policymakers (Smith 2000 and McCormick 2012).  The internationalisation of the 
Northern Ireland conflict is likewise well established in the historiography of the 
topic (DeConde 1992, Guelke 1984 and 1996).  The concern for Irish affairs in the 
United States is perhaps understandable given that in the 1970 census, sixteen million 
Americans cited some form of Irish heritage.  In 1980, the number of Americans 
describing their ethnic background as Irish was almost forty-one million (Wilson 
1995, 73).  In spite of this large domestic constituent, during the early 1970s there 
was little pressure from the American executive branch directed towards the British 
government in relation to Northern Ireland.  However, this changed as the decade 
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progressed, ostensibly in line with the increase of Americans citing Irish descent.  
O’Neill was a key protagonist in Irish-American contributions to resolving the 
paramilitary sectarian violence known as the ‘Troubles’ that resulted from the 
divisions caused by Northern Ireland’s constitutional relationship within the United 
Kingdom.  This article will add contribute to the historiography in a number of 
different ways.  It will discuss O’Neill’s efforts to ensure that American pressure on 
the Anglo-Irish process evolved and how – at times – it created Anglo-American 
tension.  Furthermore, it will show the extent that that domestic lobbying could 
influence American foreign policy and whether O’Neill was able to ensure that 
President Ronald Reagan was able to act on an issue that did not particularly 
interested him.  
  
 Tip O’Neill was a key protagonist in Irish-American contributions to 
resolving the paramilitary sectarian violence known as the ‘Troubles’ that resulted 
from the divisions caused by Northern Ireland’s constitutional relationship within the 
United Kingdom.  A prominent Irish-American and Catholic politician, O’Neill 
enjoyed a successful career in Massachusetts State politics before being first elected 
to the U.S. House of Representatives in 1953.  After securing senior leadership 
positions amongst the House Democrats during the 1970s, he became speaker in 
1977.  O’Neill would prove to be a keen defender and advocate of ‘New Deal’ 
policies during his speakership (1977-1987) as he worked alongside presidents Carter 
and Reagan (Farrell 2001, 419-672).  His Irish Catholic and working class childhood, 
coupled with his public interest in the Northern Ireland conflict since the ‘Troubles’ 
began during the late 1960s, ensured that he was one of the key Irish-American 
politicians calling for a satisfactory constitutional settlement in Northern Ireland, 
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while simultaneously condemning the violence of the IRA and its American financial 
support (Wilson 1995, 130-31).  The ‘Troubles’ were a violent period in the history of 
the UK and Ireland, whereby the constitutional arrangements and national identity of 
Northern Ireland were in dispute.  In short, the Protestant Unionist community wanted 
Northern Ireland to remain part of the UK while the Catholic Nationalist community 
sought a British withdrawal from Northern Ireland and the restoration of a united 
Ireland.  Violent acts by the Irish Republic Army (IRA) were responsible for 
thousands of fatalities and injuries in Northern Ireland and Great Britain. 1   
 
O’Neill’s interest in Northern Ireland dated back to the beginning of his 
political career.  As speaker of the Massachusetts House he wrote to Irish officials 
about the issue and later, even as a freshman congressman, called for a united Ireland.  
His republican sympathies developed into a concern for the civil rights of Catholics in 
Northern Ireland at the outbreak of the ‘Troubles’ and criticism of the British 
response, for instance the ‘Bloody Sunday’ shootings in Derry in 1972 and 
internment without trial (Farrell 2001, 510-11).  As speaker, O’Neill was clearly one 
of America’s senior political figures (as speaker he was technically third in line to the 
presidency) and his views – on topics including Northern Ireland – carried weight in 
American political discourse.  O’Neill was determined to use his influence to further 
interests of a peaceful and constitutional settlement in Northern Ireland.     
 
George B. Galloway, historian of the US House of Representatives, described 
the speakership as ‘an office of great honor and influence’ (Galloway 1955, 346).  
The position entails key powers and duties: establishing floor procedures, precedents 
for rule making, points of order, and directing and influencing legislative committees.  
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The speaker is ultimately responsible for seeing that the House passes legislation 
(Green 2010, 3-4).  The importance of the speakership is further underlined by the 
fact that since the 1947 Presidential Succession Act, the speaker is next in line for the 
US presidency if the president and vice-president are both unable to carry out their 
duties.  In addition, the speaker has the procedural and bureaucratic means to 
influence foreign policy.  Indeed, concurrent to broader powers that determine the use 
of government funds, confirmation of cabinet officials, and – in the case of the Senate 
– approval of treaties, Congress enjoys specific powers, in accordance with Article 1, 
Section 8 of the Constitution, to: 
 
provide for the common Defence,” “To regulate Commerce with foreign 
Nations,” “To define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high 
seas,” “To declare war,” “To raise and support Armies,” “To provide and 
maintain a Navy,” and “To make Rules for the Government and Regulation 
of the land and naval Forces.” (Lindsay 2012, 225) 
 
In sum, the speaker can potentially have a real impact as an actor in American foreign 
policy by guiding American investment in some areas rather than others.  Congress is 
also able to influence public opinion and, as result, foreign policy more generally 
through its powers to debate issues and carry out investigations and hearings (Lindsay 
2012, 225-226)  
       
During the 1970s Irish Americans seized on reports of human rights abuses in 
Northern Ireland, which would appeal to the broader human rights concerns of 
leading political figures, such as Carter.  The British government increasingly 
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presented the conflict as anti-terrorist and anti-communist – aspects that appealed to 
some quarters in the United States, including the Reagan administration in the 1980s 
(Dixon 2008, 169).2  Thus, the role of prominent Irish-Americans in the political 
process and the support of some Americans for the Irish Northern Aid Committee 
(NORAID) – a financier of IRA activities – became a fixture in Anglo-American 
relations.  In 1971 the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) investigated NORAID 
and determined that it should register as a ‘foreign agent’.  A joint communiqué by 
the US president, Gerald Ford, and the Irish Taoiseach, Liam Cosgrave, urged Irish-
Americans to stop supporting NORAID.  This signalled the beginning of a new 
political strategy to utilise Irish-American politicians to influence the political process 
in Washington D.C., and in turn Anglo-American relations, in order to reach a 
settlement in Northern Ireland.  By the end of the decade, this plan seemed to be 
working.  The ‘Four Horsemen’ –O’Neill, Senator Ted Kennedy (D-MA), Governor 
Hugh Carey (D-NY), and Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-NY) – were key 
activists in favour of a solution to the ‘Troubles’ (Dumbrell 2006, 247-48).  This 
strategy, developed by Sean Donlon, a senior Irish foreign office civil servant and 
later Irish ambassador to the United States, sought to use leading Irish-American 
politicians to tackle American support for the IRA and pressure the US government to 
influence the British into addressing the conflict.  O’Neill was a key component of 
this plan, albeit it resulted in much criticism from many Irish-Americans in Boston 
and New York City, particularly those bars in Boston that were home to fund-raising 
jars for NORAID (Farrell 2001, 511-12). O’Neill and his Irish-American colleagues 
benefited from the advice and expertise of, for instance, John Hume, a civil rights 
leader from Derry, Northern Ireland and other leading colleagues in Northern 
Ireland’s Social and Democratic Labour Party (Thompson 2001, 69).  This foretold 
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the involvement of extra-political protagonists during the Clinton administration, such 
as William Flynn, an Irish-American businessman based in New York City 
(Thompson 2001, 174-76).  During the 1970s, the conflict increasingly became a 
factor in American politics: Carter used Northern Ireland as a campaign issue during 
the 1976 presidential election in order to capture the Irish-American vote (Dixon 
2008, 167).  Subsequently, as president, Carter issued a statement in 1977 promising 
American investment if a power sharing solution could be agreed (Dumbrell 2006, 
247-48).  He explained: 
 
Throughout our history, Americans have rightly recalled the contributions 
men and women from many countries have made to the development of the 
United States. Among the greatest contributions have been those of the 
British and Irish people, Protestant and Catholic alike. We have close ties of 
friendship with both parts of Ireland and with Great Britain.3 
 
He further added: 
 
It is natural that Americans are deeply concerned about the continuing 
conflict and violence in Northern Ireland. We know the overwhelming 
majority of the people there reject the bomb and the bullet. The United States 
wholeheartedly supports peaceful means for finding a just solution that 
involves both parts of the community of Northern Ireland … and protects 
human rights and guarantees freedom from discrimination--a solution that the 
people in Northern Ireland, as well as the Governments of Great Britain and 
Ireland can support. 
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Carter made it clear that his administration had ‘no intention of telling the parties how 
this might be achieved’.  However, he stressed that ‘the people of Northern Ireland 
should know that they have our complete support in their quest for a peaceful and just 
society’.  The president noted that Northern Ireland ‘continued to attract investment, 
despite the violence committed by a small minority’ which would ‘create jobs’ and 
‘assist in ensuring a healthy economy and combating unemployment’.  Consequently, 
as Carter explained,  
 
It is still true that a peaceful settlement would contribute immeasurably to 
stability in Northern Ireland and so enhance the prospects for increased 
investment. In the event of such a settlement, the U.S. Government would be 
prepared to join with others to see how additional job creating investment 
could be encouraged, to the benefit of all the people of Northern Ireland. 
 
Crucially, Carter’s statement also condemned Irish-American support for violence in 
Northern Ireland and the UK generally: 
 
We hope that all those engaged in violence will renounce this course and 
commit themselves to peaceful pursuit of legitimate goals … I ask all 
Americans to refrain from supporting with financial or other aid 
organizations whose involvement, direct or indirect, in this violence delays 
the day when the people of Northern Ireland can live and work together in 
harmony, free from fear.4 
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This was the first time that a US president stated that there would be American 
assistance should there be a resolution to the conflict.  By criticising republican 
supporters of the IRA in the United States and promising economic assistance should 
the conflict be resolved, the precedent was established for subsequent American 
interventions (Dixon 2008, 171). 
 
O’Neill and his Irish-American colleagues continued to follow a similar 
strategy:  condemning violence by all parties on the one hand and calling for political 
action from the British and Irish governments on the other.  In their 1978 St. Patrick’s 
Day statement, the ‘Four Horsemen’ – alongside fourteen other leading politicians, 
including senators Joe Biden (D-DE) and Gary Hart (D-CO) – were critical of 
financial support of Irish-Americans to the activities of the IRA but also attributed the 
failure of progress on Northern Ireland to the Unionists and the British government.  
A month prior to O’Neill’s visit to the United Kingdom, the results of the Bennett 
Report prompted another St Patrick’s Day statement by the Horsemen, accusing the 
British government of negligence in the human rights abuses of IRA suspects 
detained at interrogation centres in Northern Ireland.5  O’Neill hoped that by meeting 
with the leadership of the Conservative and Labour parties during the general election 
he would raise the profile of the political settlement required to end the Troubles in 
British political discourse (Wilson 1995, 154-55).  The visit also coincided with the 
so-called ‘dirty protests’ by prisoners at H-Block in the Maze Prison.  The removal of 
‘special category’ status in 1976 – meaning that IRA convicts were no longer granted 
political status and related privileges – prompted such prisoners to defile their cells in 
protest with the so-called ‘dirty protests’ beginning in 1978.  O’Neill would also raise 
this issue with the British government.     
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1979: O’Neill visits London 
 
According to a press statement issued by the speaker’s office, O’Neill was to 
lead a bipartisan delegation of US representatives to Great Britain, Belgium, Hungary 
and Ireland between 11 and 23 April 1979.  The expedition was prompted by 
invitations issued by the governments of Ireland and Hungary to the speaker.  The 
delegation would hold meetings in Brussels with people important to U.S. foreign 
policy interests, namely General Haig – who served as NATO commander in chief – 
to discuss ‘Allied defense posture in Europe’.6  Likewise, there would be meetings 
about ‘trade and other international economic issues with key members of the 
European Economic Community’.  The purpose of the meetings with British leaders 
was discussion about ‘matters of mutual interest’, with Northern Ireland ‘a major 
topic’.7  The visit to Ireland, at the personal invitation of Jack Lynch, the Taoiseach, 
would be the lengthiest.  Discussions would focus on Ireland’s emerging role in the 
European Community and the situation in Northern Ireland.  According to the press 
release, the overriding remit of the expedition was to ‘to provide the leadership of the 
House of Representatives the opportunity to gain firsthand knowledge of our defense 
position in Europe, to explore avenues for improved economic and political relations 
with Eastern Europe, and to assess developments in Ireland’.8  The congressional 
delegation accompanying O’Neill consisted of: Dan Rostenkowski (D-IL.), Thomas 
S. Foley (D-WA.), Thomas L. Ashley (D-OH), Samuel L. Devine (R-OH), Delbert L. 
Latta (R-OH), Morris K. Udall (D-AZ), Edward J. Patten (D-NJ), Joseph M. McDade 
(R-PA.), and James M. Hanley (D-NY).9  In addition to being a bipartisan delegation, 
they were all experienced and senior US representatives.  Such expeditions were, and 
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continue to be, common for US congressmen.  Prior to O’Neill’s departure, the Los 
Angeles Times mocked the fact that so many representatives and senators were 
departing the US during the recess.  It noted that, for instance, during ‘the next few 
days there will be more members of Congress in China than sometimes can be found 
on the floor of the House or Senate’.  (43 congressmen were scheduled to be in China 
as part of three delegations.)10 
 
 The speaker consulted with the US State Department in advance of his 
congressional expedition to Europe.  In letters to the US secretary of state, Cyrus R. 
Vance, and the secretary of defense, Harold Brown, O’Neill explained that the 
mission of his delegation was to  
 
provide the Leadership of the House of Representatives the opportunity to 
gain firsthand knowledge of our defense and diplomatic positions in Europe, 
to explore avenues of greater communication with the Eastern European 
Communist Block, and to investigate feasible American contributions to a 
resolution of Northern Ireland’s troubles.11 
 
A similar statement was issued by the Speaker’s Room as a press release.12  O’Neill 
was briefed on the outcome of the Multilateral Trade Negotiations (MTNs),13 in 
addition to State Department briefings about European relations, Britain, and Ireland.   
 
 On Northern Ireland, State Department reference papers noted that ‘terrorist 
attacks have spread outside Northern Ireland itself’.14  In regards to the official US 
position, the papers explained that in his 1977 statement, ‘President Carter 
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emphasized our government’s impartiality in the Northern Ireland situation, 
condemning violence and urging that all parties to the conflict seek a commonly 
acceptable, peaceful resolution’.  However, Carter had also promised American 
financial investment in Northern Ireland ‘following a peaceful settlement’.  
American-Irish relations were noted by the briefing to be ‘traditionally close’, 
although the Irish government was ‘concerned about the views of some Irish-
Americans on the issue of Northern Ireland and have strongly requested that 
Americans refrain from contributing to organizations that support violence in 
Ireland’.15  
 
 The British civil service fully understood O’Neill’s role as a representative of 
the US government, as can be seen from the preparations they made for his reception.  
On the news that O’Neill would be visiting London, senior civil servants strongly 
encouraged Callaghan to meet with him.  The Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
(FCO) explained to Downing Street that the speaker was ‘one of the three or four 
most influential politicians’ in American politics.16  Meetings between British 
politicians and senior figures from Congress were not uncommon:  Callaghan 
previously met with Senator Robert Byrd (D-WV), the Senate Majority Leader, twice 
in 1978.  However, as the FCO observed, O’Neill was a much more experienced and 
dominating figure than Byrd.  Indeed, O’Neill’s importance was emphasised to 
Downing Street: ‘We look to him for help over a wide variety of issues above all in 
Northern Ireland.’17  O’Neill was therefore clearly someone with who the British 
government had to ensure a working relationship.  
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 Callaghan received a list of briefs in advance of O’Neill’s visit:  Northern 
Ireland, MTNs, Civil Aviation, Energy, Rhodesia, Namibia, SALT II, and the 
Arab/Israel situation.  Northern Ireland, MTNs and energy were discussed during the 
meeting at Downing Street.18  O’Neill’s importance to British policy in regards to 
Northern Ireland and the role of Irish-Americans was stressed.  Briefs encouraged 
Callaghan to take the line that:  
 
The Government appreciates Mr O’Neill’s constructive interest in the 
problems of Northern Ireland, his condemnation of violence and support for 
the principle that any solution must be acceptable to all parties.  The 
Government appreciates his efforts to resist the pressure for Congressional 
Hearings which could only aggravate divisions in Northern Ireland.19  
 
However, the prime minister was urged to emphasise that the House of Commons 
(Re-distribution of Seats) Act 1979 did not represent any favouritism towards the 
Unionists.  Likewise, Callaghan was to inform O’Neill that even though ‘self-
imposed squalor at the Maze prison regrettably continues’, his government would not 
‘grant political status to those convicted of’ what he called ‘criminal acts’.20  
 
As arranged, the Congressional delegation arrived in London for meetings 
with the leader of the opposition and the prime minster.  O’Neill’s records detail the 
delegation’s meeting with Thatcher.21  They asked Thatcher about the policies of a 
potential Conservative government in Northern Ireland.  She explained: ‘both the 
Labour and Conservative Parties have adhered to a bipartisan approach to Northern 
Ireland, and that it was not the subject of public debate in the campaign’.  Without 
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going into detail, Thatcher added that her party’s manifesto prioritised the ‘defeat of 
terrorism’, and her government ‘would move to increase security in Northern 
Ireland’.22  Northern Ireland was a bipartisan policy and not a campaign issue: 
Thatcher was effectively ending any discussion of the issue with O’Neill before it had 
even begun.  Immediately after meeting with Thatcher, O’Neill called on Callaghan at 
10 Downing Street.23  The twelve members of the congressional delegation and the 
US ambassador, Kingman Brewster, accompanied the speaker for a one-hour meeting 
in the Cabinet room – Callaghan clearly intended to use his incumbency to maximum 
effect.  A one-hour meeting was ostensibly polite of Callaghan, but given the number 
of issues discussed the length was not particularly unusual or excessive.  The issues 
discussed were:  East-West relations, trade negotiations, Northern Ireland, and 
energy.  Hanley asked Callaghan about the future of Northern Ireland generally and 
O’Neill asked specifically about the conditions in H Block in the Maze prison.  Not 
wishing to make promises about a settlement in Northern Ireland that could prove a 
hostage to fortune, the prime minister addressed Hanley by admitting that he could 
not offer a satisfactory response, although the government could continue to ‘search 
for a solution to the problems of the province’.  In regards to H Block, Callaghan was 
much more forthright.  He turned the question back on the speaker, asking if he could 
offer a solution.  According to the minutes, ‘O’Neill acknowledged that he had none’ 
and Callaghan argued that the ‘situation of deliberate defilement to which Speaker 
O’Neill had referred applied only to a part of H block’.  Moreover, the prime minister 
noted how ‘in the remainder of the block the conditions were in every way superior to 
… most American prisons’.  Callaghan continued to explain the British government’s 
position in the clearest of terms:  they ‘would never agree to treat murderers, who had 
been found guilty by due process of law, as political prisoners’.  In addition, he 
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reminded the delegation ‘that most of the weapons with which their murders had been 
committed, and money to buy more, came from the United States’.  The prime 
minster clearly saw this meeting as an opportunity to emphasise the need for 
American support in combating the actions of the IRA and to remind Irish-Americans 
of the American contribution to the very problems that they demanded the British 
government resolve.  Similarly, Callaghan offered the delegation very little in return 
for their interest in Northern Ireland:  he was noncommittal on peace prospects and in 
some respects rebuked the congressmen in regards to prison conditions and NORAID.   
 
However, concurrent to his government’s resolute stance towards violence, 
Callaghan added that after the general election, the Labour government intended to 
‘examine all possible solutions to the political problem of Northern Ireland including, 
for example, the suggestion of confederation’.  Nevertheless, as he reminded the 
delegation, the IRA would remain ‘an obstacle to a political solution’.  This 
discussion allowed Callaghan to request that O’Neill convey his thanks to the 
Taoiseach for the Irish government’s assistance in security matters.  Hanley again 
participated in the discussion, noting that a Peace Forum would be held in 
Washington D.C. in May that year, whereby there would be discussions about a 
political solution to the Northern Ireland situation.  Callaghan requested that the 
private conclusions of the forum be given to him.  The final aspect of the discussion 
about Northern Ireland was prompted by O’Neill’s question about whether more 
parliamentary seats recently being given to Northern Ireland reflected ‘a softer line 
towards the Protestants’ and a potential agreement with the Ulster Unionists.  
Although the prime minister was diplomatic and empathised with such conclusions, 
he stated that the Unionists had gained a solution to a grievance about the 
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‘representational arithmetic’.  Nevertheless, Callaghan candidly admitted that it 
worked as an example of political pragmatism too:  if the government ‘had refused to 
allow the Unionists to take their entirely justified grievance … to the Speaker’s 
Conference, the Labour Government would have fallen’.24  The American record of 
this meeting is similar to the British account.25 Callaghan warned that there would not 
be ‘any significant policy changes towards the problem of Northern Ireland’ and 
claimed ‘that less than 1% of the British electorate have viewed the problem in 
Northern Ireland as an important national issue’.26  The British may have recognised 
O’Neill importance in terms of his political position and potential role in helping 
them with Northern Ireland, but Callaghan arguably sought to school the speaker and 
his delegation in what he viewed to be the political reality of the situation.   
 
1979: O’Neill visits Dublin and Belfast  
 
 After leaving London, O’Neill’s delegation held meetings with European 
leaders before final stops in Ireland and Northern Ireland (Wilson 1995, 155).  
According to the American record, discussions during O’Neill’s meeting with the 
Taoiseach, Jack Lynch, inevitably revolved around the issue of Northern Ireland.27  
Lynch argued that even though the majority of Irish citizens condemned the IRA, the 
continuing violence and resulting tension ensured that the ‘the British government 
was limited in its ability or willingness to solve the problem’.  Indeed, Lynch, 
ostensibly advocating the unification of Ireland, stated that ultimately it was up to the 
British government to initiate a solution and that simply withdrawing from Northern 
Ireland was inadequate.  According to Lynch, ‘the British government must make the 
first initiative to promote reunification of the Irish people as the only ultimate 
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solution, and should indicate to the Unionists that their destiny rests ultimately with 
the entire island of Ireland as a viable member of the European Community’.  The 
Irish government would contribute ‘by promoting economic cooperation between the 
two parts of the island’.  He was ‘impressed’ by Carter’s statement about Northern 
Ireland in 1977 and hoped that he ‘would encourage the next British Government to 
take positive steps to reach a workable, peaceful solution’.  Like Callaghan, albeit 
from a different political perspective, Lynch believed that Irish-American financial 
aid to the IRA had undermined efforts towards solving the problem.  Indeed, IRA 
activity threatened the political aspects of the Republican cause.28  
 
 The Irish record of O’Neill’s meeting with the Taoiseach offers a more 
detailed account.29  The meeting also included Kirk O’Donnell (O’Neill’s aide), 
William Shannon, the U.S. ambassador to Ireland, an Irish foreign minister 
(presumably Michael O’Kennedy), and Dermot Nally, a senior civil servant.  O’Neill 
and Lynch discussed the political scene in Ireland and the United States.  In a 
comment that proved to be a hostage to fortune, O’Neill observed that Carter would 
win a second term as president, Kennedy would not mount a challenge for the 
Democratic nomination, and that while Reagan would be the Republican nominee, 
‘he did not give much for his chances’.  On the concerns for Northern Ireland 
amongst Irish-Americans, the speaker believed that it would become a key issue in 
American politics.  According to O’Neill, around ‘35% of the Democratic Party were 
Catholic – and a large number of them Irish.  They were saying that if the President 
could bring about peace between Israel and Egypt, why could he not intervene, on his 
own doorstep and achieve a similar settlement in Northern Ireland’.  Northern Ireland 
was therefore of concern to the Democratic base, which sought action in Carter’s 
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foreign policy and O’Neill was keen to see action.  The Irish record also notes that 
Lynch recognised that Northern Ireland would not feature prominently in the UK 
general election and that it was the responsibility of ‘the British Government to 
produce proposals’ to resolve the conflict and they would ultimately have to ‘tell the 
unionist majority – and the minority there – that they would have to find some 
accommodation’.  For Lynch, ‘British policy now was guaranteeing the continuance 
of the status quo, with all its uncertainties and instability’, as many of them saw ‘the 
main issue’ to be ‘the violence and the killing of soldiers’.  The foreign minister 
concurred, adding that ‘many British politicians saw the problem only in terms of 
security’.   
 
Thus, the problem for O’Neill and his Irish colleagues was how to change the 
political debate from security to one about stability.  O’Neill inquired as to whether 
the Taoiseach wished him to pass on ‘any message’ to ‘the power of the American 
Government’.  The speaker was clearly offering to use his political position and 
relationship with the White House to further their common cause of developing a 
peace process.  In response, Lynch ‘stressed that timing was essential or the whole 
issue could blow up in our faces.  There were many interests involved, not all with 
clean hands’.30  The Irish record includes details of the meeting between the 
Taoiseach and the entire congressional delegation. They discussed the strength of 
U.S.-Irish relations, the importance of the U.S. in the world, the Irish economy, and 
Ireland’s role in the EC.  More specific topics were inflation, the Irish postal strike, 
health care, energy, OPEC and oil production, the Taoiseach’s appreciation for 
Carter’s 1977 statement, and the strength of the IRA.31  Interestingly, in advance of 
the meeting with the congressional delegation, the steering note for the Taoiseach 
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observed that Irish-Americans viewed ‘the Northern Ireland problem in very 
simplistic terms’ with ‘the British presence in Northern Ireland as the only problem’ 
and little understanding of ‘the strength of unionist sentiment or the explosive nature 
of inter-community tensions in Northern Ireland’.32  The Irish government, though 
clearly grateful for the support of prominent Irish-American politicians, therefore 
matched  - though from opposite sides – their British counterparts in their frustration 
of some American misconceptions (as discussed below).  The complexities of the 
Northern Ireland question and the potential for achieving a politically united Ireland – 
in addition to the hope of a culturally united Ireland – are best summarised by 
Lynch’s comment to Carter at this time.  The Taoiseach’s response to Carter’s 
question about whether he wanted a politically united Ireland was, simply, ‘Jaysus, 
No’ (Bew 2011, 44).  
 
O’Neill also met with the two opposition leaders:  Dr Garret FitzGerald of 
Fine Gael and Frank Clusky of the Labour Party.  Fitzgerald outlined his view that the 
situation ‘is deadlocked in part because of the deadlock in the British Parliament’ and 
that ‘while there were very few British politicians who actually believed in a United 
Kingdom … Thatcher was a notable exception’.  (Thatcher’s position was obviously 
significant as at the time of this meeting she stood a strong chance of becoming 
British prime minister.)  After offering some background information on the Northern 
Ireland political scene, the Fine Gael leader observed that O’Neill’s ‘fact-finding 
mission’ to Northern Ireland was ‘significant’ as the rival political groups there would 
then ‘understand that the outside world was concerned about the problem, and that the 
interests of Northern Ireland were not perceived in a remote, isolated vacuum’.  
While positive about O’Neill’s delegation and clearly welcoming an 
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internationalisation of the conflict, Fitzgerald added caveats to his enthusiasm 
towards some American involvement.  He ‘expressed opposition’ to ‘a Peace Forum 
planned this summer in the United States, because no political party in Ireland would 
participate in a meeting where terrorists were invited’.  After this meeting, O’Neill 
then met with President Patrick Hillery to further discuss Irish affairs.33 
 
 Despite meeting with Callaghan, Thatcher, Lynch and Fitzgerald, O’Neill’s 
visit to the British Isles was still not deemed particularly newsworthy until his speech 
at Dublin Castle during a dinner given in his honour.  In his toast remarks, O’Neill 
was forthright in his criticism of the British government and British politicians.34  The 
speaker declared that he was ‘deeply concerned by the lack of political progress in 
Northern Ireland over the last few years’ and that he agreed with Irish politicians that 
‘Britain bears a heavy responsibility for the failures of recent years on the political 
front’.  O’Neill remarked, ‘We have been concerned that the problem has been treated 
as a political football in London or has otherwise been given a low priority.’  The 
speaker continued to criticise one of his previous hosts, stating that ‘there is no more 
serious problem on the agenda of British politics than a crisis which has claimed 
2,000 lives and caused almost 20,000 serious injuries’.  Provocatively, the speaker 
presented himself as nonpartisan in the British general election albeit determined to 
insist that the subsequent government act on Northern Ireland: ‘It is not our concern 
to favour one party or another on the forthcoming elections in Britain but we do insist 
on an early, realistic and major initiative on the part of the incoming British 
Government so as to get serious negotiations moving quickly towards a just, realistic 
and workable solution.’35  O’Neill’s lexical choice – namely ‘we do insist’ – certainly 
allowed the wider audience in Britain and Ireland to conclude that he was speaking on 
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behalf of the US government: the speaker of the House was in Ireland telling the 
British government that the Americans insisted that they address the Northern Ireland 
situation once and for all.  The Taoiseach praised O’Neill during his speech, 
discussing the role of the Four Horsemen in Irish-American attempts to resolve the 
Northern Ireland issue.  Citing his appreciation for Carter’s statement in 1977, Lynch 
acknowledged the part played by O’Neill, Kennedy, Moynihan and Carey, ‘in the 
preparation of that statement and of the later declarations on the same subject’.36   
 
O’Neill’s comments received a fierce and bipartisan reaction from British 
politicians and the British press.  In a UK general election news conference the 
following day, which was intended to focus on trade unions, Thatcher strongly 
objected to O’Neill’s statement.  She defended herself and her opponents:  ‘we have 
never used Ulster as “a political football” between the Parties … The events there are 
too tragic, too deeply tragic for any of us to do that’.37  Thatcher argued that, if 
elected, the Conservatives would adopt a ‘step by step approach’ to Northern Ireland, 
with the first stage being the re-establishment of local government there.38  Lord 
Hailsham also explained Conservative frustrations towards O’Neill:  
 
I would say to him, and to Senator Kennedy, that they should bear in mind 
that Britain is also an independent country. 
They do nothing but harm by their comments, with which they are trying to 
win a few Irish votes.  We resent these people electioneering in their own 
country by speaking in ours.39  
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While O’Neill may have been representing the wishes of his own constituents, he was 
undoubtedly interested in Irish affairs.  But his knowledge of the issue was further 
question by the Labour Party.  Speaking on their behalf, Shirley Williams, observed: 
‘The Irish-American community has very little idea of the truth of the position in the 
Republic of Ireland or in Northern Ireland.’40  O’Neill’s contribution to the Anglo-
Irish process was certainly not a welcome one for much of the British political 
establishment.    
 
Editorial comment in the British press also resented the speaker’s 
intervention.  For instance, The Guardian sharply observed: ‘There must be some 
sympathy in Britain of all places, for Mr O’Neill’s uncomprehension [sic.] of other 
people’s crassness.  Britain spent a long time overseas trying, usually without 
success, to knock some sense into the average native.’41  This was a critique of 
O’Neill’s ‘insist’ remark:  the Guardian was rejecting O’Neill’s intervention as neo-
colonialist language that the UK had moved on from.  Further criticising O’Neill, the 
editorial noted how he had ‘a privileged status in these matters’, given his position as 
‘a man of influence in the White House’ who could ‘gain attention denied to others 
struggling behind him on that same path to righteousness’.42  The exasperation with 
him was neatly summarised:  
 
if Mr O’Neill is deliberately withholding, perhaps from modesty, perhaps 
from reluctance to seem to intervene, the master plan for Ireland, we would 
urge him to be less bashful and tell us what it is.  As long as it guarantees 
Irish unity and allows Northern Ireland to be part of the United Kingdom it is 
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bound to succeed.  We shall kick ourselves for not realising how simple it all 
is.43  
   
The Daily Express, addressing a wider and generally conservatively-inclined 
readership, was vehement in its criticism of O’Neill.  An editorial was scathing in its 
criticism of the speaker, describing him as ‘a log-rolling, Irish-American politician, 
out to raise votes in the United States by pandering to anti-British prejudice on the 
part of his fellow Irish-Americans’.44 O’Neill was accused of ‘pontificating about the 
tragedy of Northern Ireland, about which he obviously knows nothing’.  He was told 
by the Express to ‘go home and get on with wheeler-dealing in the U.S. Congress’.45  
O’Neill certainly succeeded in having Northern Ireland discussed during the British 
general election.   
  
 The Massachusetts as well as the Irish press were more positive about 
O’Neill’s intervention and his intentions.  A Boston Globe editorial noted that while 
‘O’Neill’s remarks were technically an intrusion’, ultimately ‘the British and Irish are 
going to have to sort out the problems left over from centuries of rule and misrule in 
Ireland’.46 However, O’Neill’s comments had ‘raised the consciousness, and may 
even have tickled the conscience, of the British in a way that, once their election is 
over, will produce tangible and creative change’.47  O’Neill’s domestic needs had 
therefore been served.  The Irish Sunday Independent reported that O’Neill’s 
comments were simply in response to his meeting with Callaghan.  The prime 
minister’s remarks that his deal with the Unionist MPs was agreed to extend the life 
of his government had reportedly ‘genuinely shocked’ the speaker, who was certainly 
unsympathetic despite the two being kindred ‘wheeler dealer’ politicians.48  Similarly, 
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O’Neill’s meeting with Thatcher was equally disappointing for the speaker.  He 
‘found her almost completely ignorant of the Northern Ireland situation – and 
somewhat surprised that a senior American politician should make a visit to London 
to discuss it’.  In regards to the reaction by British politicians to his statement, 
O’Neill was reported to have been ‘at first somewhat shaken at the storm he had 
caused, and later angry at the suggestion … that he knew nothing about the 
complexities of the problems’.49  It is unknown whether the Sunday Independent had 
been briefed by O’Neill’s aides.  However, if the furore had genuinely shocked 
O’Neill, then the speaker was ostensibly a less hard-headed politico than his popular 
image or, as perhaps is more likely the case, his strengths in domestic politics were 
equalled by a relative innocence in foreign policy.   
  
 Following his discussions in Dublin, O’Neill and a smaller delegation 
undertook a visit to Belfast, where he held talks with leading Northern Ireland 
politicians at the residence of Charles Stout, U.S. consulate.50  This additional visit 
and ‘secret talks’ was reported to have been ‘unexpected’.51  He ‘met with Gerry Fitt, 
leader of the SDLP; Harry West, official Unionist; Oliver Napier, Alliance Party; and 
Rev. Ian Paisley, Democratic Unionist Party’.52  There was subsequently widespread 
press speculation that Carter was planning a Camp David summit to resolve the 
Northern Ireland conflict akin to the 1978 Camp David Accords that addressed the 
Egypt-Israel conflict.  The Irish Independent claimed that it was ‘known for sure’ that 
O’Neill ‘was in the North on the specific instructions of the President’.53  However, 
perhaps signalling Carter administration unhappiness with the speculation, the White 
House dismissed such a notion.  According to the Sunday Telegraph, O’Neill was 
widely presumed to deliver a report on ‘fact finding mission’ to Carter, but any 
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suggestion that it would lead to a Carter administration initiative was deemed by 
administration officials to be ‘pure fantasy’.54 O’Neill himself was quoted in the 
Boston Globe as rejecting such thoughts:  ‘President Carter asked me to bring 
greetings to Irish Prime Minister (Jack) Lynch, and I did … That this (the meetings 
with party leaders) leads to a Camp David summit is a figment of everyone’s 
imagination’.55  Nevertheless, the speaker hoped that his visits to Ireland and 
Northern Ireland would ‘stimulate interest’.56   
 
There is no available evidence suggesting that O’Neill was the vanguard of a 
Carter peace initiative.  Yet O’Neill’s influence over the U.S. response to the 
Northern Ireland conflict was clear.  In June 1979 the speaker publicly supported a 
ban on American weapon sales to the Royal Ulster Constabulary, hoping that a ban 
would prompt the new Conservative government to resolve the conflict.  Much to the 
displeasure of the UK government and U.S. State Department, in August 1979 
O’Neill allowed the amendment banning the sales attached to the State Department 
annual appropriations Bill to pass through Congress.  The Carter administration 
accepted the ban, prioritising its domestic legislative programme and working 
relationship with the speaker over any potential offence made to the Thatcher 
government (Wilson 1995, 159-60).  Any hope that a ban would prompt the 
Conservative government into action was wishful thinking, but it was clearly a 
deliberately provocative gesture to the Irish-American political base: the IRA would 
not be funded from the USA but the RUC would not be able to purchase weapons 
from the USA either.   
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O’Neill and his fellow Horsemen also held some influence over the British 
and Irish governments.  When Charles Haughey, the Taoiseach, sought to replace 
Sean Donlon, the Irish ambassador to the United States, in 1980, in response to his 
close working relationship with the British Embassy, the Horsemen strongly opposed 
the move.  Thus, Donlon was allowed to continue his work of informing a sufficient 
bloc of congressmen and supporters in the U.S. State Department who would prove 
useful for the Irish government in the future (Thompson 2001, 91).  Despite the 
hostility towards his Dublin Castle speech, the lobbying of O’Neill and the Horsemen 
helped to persuade Humphrey Atkins to launch an ultimately unsuccessful political 
initiative, holding inter-party talks in Northern Ireland in 1980 (Thompson 2001, 80 
and Guelke 1984).  It is clear that O’Neill and his Irish-American colleagues were 
able to influence some developments in this aspect of American foreign policy, 
despite being ostensible actors in domestic politics.    
 
The Northern Ireland conflict continues and the New Ireland Forum 
 
 Irish-American interest in the Northern Ireland conflict continued with the 
advent of the Reagan administration.  The 1981 Hunger Strike was the focus of Irish-
American attention and that of the media in the United States.  Although the media 
coverage agreed with the British government’s stance that the republican prisoners 
should not be awarded any political status, as more strikers died criticism of 
Thatcher’s reluctance to negotiate increased.  (The death of Bobby Sands, an elected 
Member of Parliament and the lead striker, even prompted a complimentary 
biography on CBS morning news on 27 April 1981.)  NORAID’s criticism of the 
Horsemen for failing to stop the Hunger Strike led to the creation of a formal group, 
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comprising twenty-four congressmen, senators, and governors:  the ‘Friends of 
Ireland’ even enjoyed the endorsement of the new American president.  However, on 
6 May 1981, the Four Horsemen issued a public telegram to Thatcher, criticising her 
‘intransigence’ and ‘inflexibility’ as the cause of needless deaths.  The summer 
months saw the Horsemen and Irish Government attempt to lobby the Reagan 
administration into action.  Kennedy contacted the State Department while FitzGerald 
asked Reagan to convince Thatcher that a British emissary should personally 
negotiate with the striking prisoners.  On 3 August, the Friends of Ireland sent a 
telegram to Reagan in support of FitzGerald’s request.  Although Reagan did discuss 
the Hunger Strike with Thatcher at the Ottawa economic summit in July 1981, he 
assured her that his administration would not interfere in the issue.  The failure to 
convince Reagan to intervene was a dent to Irish-American and Irish government 
hopes that the U.S. government could be convinced to petition the British government 
on their behalf (Wilson 1995, 180-195).   
 
However, given Irish-American support for the Democrats, Northern Ireland 
was only of marginal concern for the Republican Party.  The Reagan administration’s 
reluctance to intervene in the Anglo-Irish process is also clear in briefings to the 
president prior to his meetings with Thatcher during his first term.  For instance, 
Alexander Haig, the secretary of State, briefed Reagan in advance of Thatcher’s visit 
to the White House in February 1981:  ‘Our policy has been to prevent Northern 
Ireland from disrupting our close cooperation with the UK and Ireland by adopting a 
policy of strict neutrality.’57  Nevertheless, this neutrality was not necessarily a 
reversal of Carter’s policy.  Indeed, Reagan’s policy towards Northern Ireland was 
explained in his first St Patrick’s Day statement as president:   
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The United States will continue to urge the parties to come together for a just 
and peaceful solution … We will continue to condemn all acts of terrorism 
and violence, for these cannot solve Northern Ireland's problems. I call on all 
Americans to question closely any appeal for financial or other aid from 
groups involved in this conflict to ensure that contributions do not end up in 
the hands of those who perpetuate violence, either directly or indirectly.58 
 
Reagan’s diplomacy was embarrassed by the comments of  William P. Clark 
Jr., the deputy secretary of state, during his visit to Ireland in December 1981.  Clark 
declared that the American people hoped to see a united Ireland.  British officials 
were furious and the State Department quickly assured them that Clark’s comment 
was not indicative of the administration’s policy.  As an Irish-American and 
longstanding friend of the president, Irish-Americans hoped that he would be an ally 
in the administration.  Unfortunately, as this case highlighted, Clark lacked sufficient 
experience in international affairs to shape American foreign policy as they had 
hoped (Thompson 2001, 99, 106). Nevertheless, he remained a supporter of American 
involvement in Northern Ireland.  In October 1982, during a meeting with Gerard 
Collins, Irish Minister for Foreign Affairs at the White House, Clark, then the 
National Security adviser, inquired as to if there was ‘anything we might do in … a 
subtle way’ in order to encourage the British government to achieve a resolution in 
the Anglo-Irish process.59  The extent of Clark’s role in the Anglo-Irish process will 
be revisited below.  That year saw continued Irish-American interest in Northern 
Ireland.  For instance, in June 1982– on Thatcher’s invitation – three American 
representatives participate in the Ditchley Conference on Northern Ireland in the UK.  
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Dennis Blair, a member of the Reagan administration’s NSC team, represented the 
White House.  O’Neill and Congress were represented by Werner Brandt, who served 
as legislative assistant Rep. Thomas Foley (D-WA).  Joseph Thompson, a leading 
political scientist, represented American academia.  At the heart of the conference 
was the British government’s ultimately unsuccessful attempt to introduce a new 
Northern Ireland Assembly (Thompson 2001, 110-112).            
  
In the meantime, if institutional and extra-institutional protagonists could not 
deliver a much desired peace process for Irish-Americans, it was hoped that the 
process of consultation about constitutional frameworks could deliver the beginnings 
of a peace process.  Thus, the New Ireland Forum (1983-84) was a source of much 
hope for Irish-Americans who sought a political solution to the Northern Ireland 
conflict, but ultimately it was the cause of the dismay and frustration that led to 
O’Neill’s appeal for Reagan’s intervention.  Constitutional nationalist parties – 
Fianna Fáil, Fine Gael, SDLP and Labour – contributed to the New Ireland Forum 
(NIF).  Sinn Fein’s exclusion stemmed from their support for violence, whereas 
unionists did not contribute as they considered the forum to be a biased process.  
Despite dividing opinion in Ireland and Northern Ireland, St Patrick’s Day in 1983 
saw the U.S. Congress issue a resolution in support of the Forum and its goal for a 
united Ireland.  Reports that Haughey and FitzGerald were divided over the NIF 
prompted O’Neill to stress that a united front was necessary if the NIF was to gain the 
support of the US government and further the nationalist cause on Capitol Hill.  In 
October 1983, Kennedy called for an American envoy to participate directly in the 
Anglo-Irish process, but Reagan again rejected such an intervention (Wilson 1995, 
240-41).  Thatcher’s emphatic rejection of the NIF’s report and its main suggestions 
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to answer the Northern Ireland question served to harden the opinion of Irish-
Americans, particularly O’Neill.  The prime minister rebuked the report after her 
November 1984 summit with FitzGerald, stating:  
 
I have made it quite clear … that a unified Ireland was one solution that is 
out. A second solution was confederation of two states. That is out. A third 
solution was joint authority. That is out. That is a derogation from 
sovereignty. We made that quite clear when the Report was published.60 
 
Thatcher’s frustration with the process was clear:  ‘Northern Ireland is part of the 
United Kingdom. She is part of the United Kingdom because that is the wish of the 
majority of her citizens. The majority wish to stay part of the United Kingdom.’  The 
prime minister’s understanding of the situation was echoed in the report itself: ‘The 
Forum Report indicated that they realized that any change in the status of Northern 
Ireland could only come about by the consent of the people of Northern Ireland’.61  
O’Neill had little choice but to ‘play the Reagan card’ in order to influence to Anglo-
Irish process.62   
 
Reagan and the advent of the 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement 
 
 The publication of the NIF coincided with Reagan’s visit to Europe in May 
1984.  Reagan’s visit to Ireland and the United Kingdom in 1984 was part of a 
broader visit to Europe which would provide footage for the president’s re-election 
campaign.  Reagan would meet with his fellow world leaders at the London 
Economic Summit and visit the beaches of Normandy to celebrate the anniversary of 
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D-Day.63  However, this tour is also significant as it marks an acceptance by the 
Reagan administration that the Northern Ireland conflict was a topic of discussion for 
the president with the British and Irish governments.  When George Schultz, the US 
Secretary of State, briefed the president about his visit to Ireland, he warned that 
FitzGerald, the Taoiseach, might ask Reagan to use his ‘good offices with Mrs. 
Thatcher’ in order to resolve the Northern Ireland question in accordance with the 
conclusions of the NIF.  Nevertheless, Reagan was advised by Schultz: ‘Without 
commenting on the merits of the report itself, your best course of action is to reaffirm 
your support for all efforts, of both the Irish and British governments, to find a 
peaceful and constitutional solution to the problems of Northern Ireland, and our 
encouragement of the Anglo-Irish dialogue on this problem.’64  Similar advice was 
given to the president in advance of his meeting with Thatcher.  Schultz observed:  
‘Making clear that the U.S. does not wish to intrude into a problem which should be 
resolved by Anglo-Irish cooperation, you might ask for her assessment of prospects 
for progress.’65  The failure of the NIF to convince Thatcher changed this stance.    
 
 Thatcher’s intransigence and, for some quarters, inflammatory remarks about 
the forum’s conclusions outraged leading Irish-Americans, including O’Neill.  The 
speaker wrote to the president, expressing his ‘deep concern that the Forum, which is 
the best hope for a peaceful, lawful and constitutional resolution to the tragedy of 
Northern Ireland may be in serious jeopardy as a result of Mrs. Thatcher’s public 
statements about the Forum’s Report’.66  O’Neill praised Reagan’s public 
condemnation of the IRA and statements that had ‘been very helpful in educating 
Americans to the real threat posed by Irish terrorists’.  However, he stressed that any 
solution in Northern Ireland ‘must be peaceful and political’ and ‘must involve the 
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reconciliation of the two identities in Northern Ireland and the active participation of 
the governments of Ireland and the United Kingdom in bringing about such a 
resolution’.  In O’Neill’s view, the NIF report represented ‘the best efforts of 
moderate elements in Northern Ireland and in Ireland to fashion a political and 
constitutional framework for achieving a political solution to the tragedy of Northern 
Ireland’.  Thus, Thatcher’s refusal to engage with it meant that ‘the forces for 
moderation’ in Ireland and America would ‘suffer significantly’.  In a final flourish, 
the speaker wrote: ‘I ask that you encourage Mrs. Thatcher to renew the Anglo-Irish 
dialogue over the Forum Report and that the Prime Minister recognize that the Forum 
has significant support in Congress and among Irish-Americans interested in bringing 
peace to the beautiful land of their forebears’.67  O’Neill was clearly adopting a more 
nuanced approach than he had previously done in 1979.  Equally disappointed by 
Thatcher’s stance, members of the Ad Hoc Congressional Committee for Irish Affairs 
also sent a letter to the president.  The Ad Hoc Committee was, of course, the rival of 
O’Neill’s Friends of Ireland in terms of establishing a legislative representative for 
Irish Americans (Thompson 2001, 79-88).  Rep. Mario Biaggi, the committee’s 
chairman, requested that Reagan include Northern Ireland on the agenda with his 
forthcoming meeting with Thatcher:  ‘We are cognizant of the need for the United 
States not to be in the position of advocating or imposing a particular solution.  
However, we contend that we can play a positive and constructive role by 
encouraging that the peace process be maintained.’68   It was hoped that the president 
would exercise ‘some quiet diplomacy … in the just pursuit of peace and justice in 
Northern Ireland’.69  O’Neill would even again write to Reagan, albeit as a member of 
the Friends of Ireland.  The Friends appealed to the president, making explicit their 
view that the American government had the ability, and duty, to intervene: 
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The Friends of Ireland in Congress believe that the United States has a 
constructive role to play in ending the violence and achieving lasting peace in 
Northern Ireland.  We are very appreciative of your own, encouraging words 
in support of the New Ireland Forum.  On behalf of the many Americans 
concerned by the lack of progress toward a just and peaceful settlement in 
Northern Ireland, we respectfully ask that you give priority to the issue of 
Northern Ireland in your discussions with Mrs. Thatcher, and that you urge 
her to build on the recent progress that has been made, with a view to 
encouraging both sides of the conflict to seek genuine compromise of their 
difference.70 
 
Clark also lobbied Reagan to raise the issue with Thatcher at Camp David and 
ensured that it was placed on the agenda (Thompson, 2001, 119). 
 
 Reagan did indeed discuss the Northern Ireland conflict with Thatcher at their 
Camp David meeting on 28 December 1984.  However, according to the minutes of 
the meeting, it was Thatcher who raised the issue and not Reagan who had been 
subject to huge pressure by the Irish-American lobby to do so.  Perhaps aware of the 
criticism directed towards her in America, the prime minister did so in a pre-
emptively defensive manner:  ‘Mrs Thatcher said she wished to address the situation 
in Northern Ireland.  Despite reports to the contrary, she and … FitzGerald were on 
good terms and we are working toward making progress on this difficult question.’71  
Reagan took this as his cue to pass on Congressional concerns: ‘The President said 
making progress is important, and observed that there is great Congressional interest 
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in this matter.  Indeed, Tip O’Neill has sent him a personal letter, asking him to 
appeal to Mrs. Thatcher to be reasonable and forthcoming.’72  Ostensibly overstating 
the extent of his representation of the speaker’s concerns, Reagan wrote to O’Neill, 
explaining: 
 
During my meeting with Mrs. Thatcher at Camp David on December 22, I 
made a special effort to bring your letter to her personal attention and to 
convey your message of concern.  I also personally emphasized the need for 
progress in resolving the complex situation in Northern Ireland, and the 
desirability for flexibility in the part of all the involved parties.73   
 
The president was seeking to stay neutral on this issue: nothing specific on Northern 
Ireland was mentioned in his meeting with Thatcher and, similarly, nothing was 
conceded.  Reagan also passed on Thatcher’s report about the complexities of the 
issue and her on-going work with FitzGerald: 
 
While emphasizing the complexity of the situation, Mrs. Thatcher made a 
point of stressing to me that press reports of her alleged differences with 
Prime Minister FitzGerald were exaggerated.  She also noted that she would 
be continuing her discussions with Prime Minister FitzGerald early in the 
new year.74 
 
Reagan’s message to O’Neill was subtle but clear: the Anglo-Irish dialogue was 
progressing and there was no need for American intervention.  This shows the 
limitations of the speaker’s influence:  Reagan and Thatcher shared a ‘special 
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relationship’ and their shared Cold Warrior interests would necessarily take 
precedence over O’Neill’s concerns for Northern Ireland.  Moreover, Reagan had 
other priorities and hoped that his exaggerated intervention would gain the speaker’s 
support for one his own foreign interests.  According to John Farrell, A National 
Security Council official noted that Reagan had discussed Northern Ireland with 
Thatcher in the first place as ‘we hoped to use this as a lever against Tip to get Contra 
aid moving’.  The president was frustrated by O’Neill’s opposition to his plans to 
fund the Contra rebels against the communist regime in Nicaragua – and the speaker 
continued to frustrate him in this regard (Farrell 2001, 624).  The subsequent Iran-
Contra affair, in which the Reagan administration illegally financed the Contras 
threatened to derail Reagan’s presidency (Schaller 2011, 73-80).         
    
In addition to his lobbying of the president, O’Neill was determined to 
exercise some quiet diplomacy of his own.  Prior to Thatcher’s address to a joint 
session of Congress in February 1985, Sir Oliver Wright, the British ambassador to 
the U.S., was informed that ‘the speaker would appreciate some discussion of 
Northern Ireland in the speech’.75  The prime minister did just that, thanking O’Neill 
and his colleagues for their support in the peace process and assuring them of her 
desire to work with the Taoiseach.  However, Thatcher actually used her remarks to 
criticise NORAID and stress that – despite Irish-American worries – she and 
FitzGerald were working together: 
 
I recognise and appreciate the efforts which have been made by the 
Administration and Congress alike to bring home this message to American 
citizens who may be misled into making contributions to seemingly 
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innocuous groups …Garret FitzGerald and I will continue to consult together 
in the quest for stability and peace in Northern Ireland and we hope we will 
have your continued support for our joint efforts to find a way forward.76   
 
According to Alex Brummer, writing in the Guardian, the encouragement of the 
Reagan administration and the sustained Congressional pressure was crucial in the 
development and signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement later that year.77  However, 
the available evidence suggests that such a claim is difficult to substantiate.  
Moreover, the subsequent Anglo-Irish Agreement fell so short of providing a 
geographically united Ireland that it does not constitute a victory for O’Neill or the 
Irish-American lobby more generally.  Thus, O’Neill’s influence over Thatcher was 
limited and his objectives similarly so.  Even when O’Neill raised the issue himself 
with Thatcher on the day of her address to Congress: ‘'He felt strongly that the 
problem needed to be resolved … but was very wary of trying to tell any government 
what to do,' an aide to the speaker said’.78 
 
The Anglo-Irish Agreement (AIA) on 15 November 1985 marked the 
culmination of Irish-American pressure since the beginning of the ‘Troubles’ (up to 
that point in time).  In short, the Anglo-Irish Agreement established that the Irish 
government would be consulted in the affairs of Northern Ireland (Vinen 2009, 
217).79 The importance of Irish-Americans, particularly Reagan and O’Neill, was 
tacitly acknowledged by the British and Irish governments.  However, their 
importance was not any role in the brokering of the deal.  What is essentially 
acknowledged is the symbolic importance attached to O’Neill and Reagan 
domestically in the United States and in Ireland.  In other words, even though the 
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AIA was not what Irish-Americans hoped the Forum would deliver, it was hoped that 
the Irish-American lobby would cease criticising the British government.  Robert C. 
McFarlane, the national security adviser, informed Reagan that Thatcher and 
FitzGerald both requested ‘through emissaries who came on a private mission’ that 
the president and speaker would endorse the AIA and reiterate their condemnation for 
violence and terrorism in a joined public appearance’.80  The joint appearance of 
‘America’s two most prominent Irishmen’ would ‘send a signal of hope and 
moderation to the people of troubled Ireland’.  According to McFarlane, the two 
governments also expressed their hope that the American government would 
‘eventually provide tangible, financial support to assist with the economic and social 
development of those areas that have suffered from the instability’.  Reagan’s 
statement would ‘lay the groundwork for possible future U.S. funding’ although the 
British government, presumably for political reasons, requested ‘some distance 
between the agreement and a formal request for funding’.   
 
The AIA was certainly an instance of cooperation between Reagan and 
O’Neill, with McFarlane observing: ‘The Speaker is impressed that you are willing, 
on the eve of your trip to Geneva, to address the Irish question personally in public.  
He wants to be supportive and helpful.  We are currently working with his staff to 
ensure that the Speaker’s brief remarks will complement yours.’ (Reagan was due to 
meet Mikhail Gorbachev for the first time.)  The American response to the AIA and 
the subsequent statements by Reagan and O’Neill were certainly taken seriously by 
the Reagan administration.  Prior to the statements, Reagan was scheduled to meet 
with O’Neill to discuss ‘bipartisan, public support’ for the AIA and ‘to lay the 
groundwork for possible future U.S. funding in support of the rebuilding of Northern 
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Ireland’.  The significance attached to it is underlined by the meetings other 
attendees: Vice President George Bush, Shultz, Donald T. Regan (White House Chief 
of Staff), McFarlane, M.B. Oglesby, Jr. (Head of Legislative Affairs), Ros Ridgway 
(Assistant Secretary of State), Ronald K. Sable (NSC), Peter R. Sommer (NSC), Kirk 
O’Donnell (O’Neill’s senior aide), Sir Oliver Wright (the British ambassador), and 
the Irish Ambassador, Pádraig MacKernan.81   
 
The parallel statements made by Reagan and O’Neill suitably applauded the 
AIA.  Reagan stated:  ‘Given the complex situation in Northern Ireland, all may not 
applaud this agreement. But let me state that the United States strongly supports this 
initiative’.82  The speaker concurred, congratulating ‘the leaders of the governments 
of Ireland and Great Britain for taking this important and courageous step of 
constructing a framework for peace and reconciliation in Northern Ireland’.83  The 
two statements highlighted the plans for American economic aid to Northern Ireland 
and this was reinforced in their shared press conference.  O’Neill commented, ‘I 
speak for the House, Mr. President -- any means that we can use in the Congress of 
the United States to help bring peace in Northern Ireland, I assure you that we'll have 
the full cooperation of the Congress; there's no question in my mind’.84  O’Neill’s 
continued interest in Northern Ireland and position as speaker had helped ensure that 
Carter’s promise of financial aid to Northern Ireland in 1977 following progress in 
the political process become a reality. O’Neill’s floor remarks during the debate on 
the resolution for aid following the AIA highlighted the decade long work of the Four 
Horsemen and the ambitions of the Carter and Reagan administrations.  The speaker 
recollected how: 
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Beginning in 1977, Senators Kennedy and Moynihan, Governor Carey and I 
issued a series of St. Patrick’s Day statements condemning the violence in 
Northern Ireland and urging Irish-Americans to withhold their support from 
the I.R.A. terrorists who were bringing death and destruction to the land of 
their forebears … Beginning in 1977 President Carter and later President 
Reagan pledged the assistance of the United States in the event that the 
United Kingdom and Ireland reached an agreement that provided a 
framework for peace and reconciliation in Northern Ireland.85   
 
He observed that although he disagreed with Reagan on many issues, they were ‘no 
differences on the need to end the violence in Northern Ireland and bring about 
political progress there in a peaceful and constitutional fashion’.  On the extent of the 
financial aid to Northern Ireland, O’Neill believed ‘that considering current budget 
restraints … this is a reasonable sum’.86  The House of Representatives’ unanimously 
voted in March 1986 for a $250 million aid package (over five years) to Northern 
Ireland.87  Within a year, O’Neill retired from the House of Representatives, and was 
able to take a great deal of public credit for American assistance to Northern Ireland.  
Given O’Neill’s opposition to NORAID and violence in Northern Ireland, and   
success in helping to ensure that the need for answers to the Northern Ireland question 
retained political momentum, it was credit that he certainly deserved.    
 
Conclusions 
 
American pressure has influenced the policies of successive British 
governments towards Northern Ireland.  The challenge to historians is to identify the 
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extent of that influence (Dixon 2008, 171).  The extent of that influence is further 
open to debate given British and Irish frustrations with how the conflict was viewed 
in the United States, including by leading Irish-American politicians.  Nevertheless, 
O’Neill’s role in putting pressure for success on the Anglo-Irish process is a clear 
example of American attempts to contribute to that dialogue and an example of the 
role of ethnicity in the domestic politics of American foreign policy.  The outcome of 
O’Neill’s (and his colleagues’) efforts was ultimately the financial aid following the 
AIA – aid first promised by Carter, but delivered by the Reagan administration and 
O’Neill’s Congress – after all, Congress controls the budget.  Reagan’s discussions 
with Thatcher about Northern Ireland were certainly prompted by a desire to engage 
with O’Neill, but the extent of the president’s interest was certainly limited.  But 
again, other priorities may have influenced Reagan’s thinking.  The president hoped 
that by being perceived to have leaned on Thatcher he might gain O’Neill’s support 
for his policy to fund the Contra rebels in Nicaragua.  In the case of American 
attitudes towards Northern Ireland, policymaking and politics were as much foreign 
as they were domestic.    
 
The speaker sought a solution to the ‘Troubles’ and the constitutional 
arrangements of Northern Ireland, and, to some extent, was successful, although the 
AIA was far from the republican settlement he had hoped to see.  Nevertheless, this is 
indicative of the potential role of the office of the speaker in foreign affairs, 
particularly when acting on an issue that crosses over from one party-led 
administration to another in a changing executive branch.  While British politicians 
initially rejected O’Neill’s intervention in the Anglo-Irish process, the criticism he 
experienced in 1979 evolved into a request for his endorsement by the British and 
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Irish governments on the advent of the AIA.  Even though the British request for 
O’Neill’s support for the AIA was made privately, it does suggest that attitudes were 
changing and that the potential value of American intervention was beginning to be 
recognised – even if it was just on a symbolic level at this stage.  O’Neill’s work on 
the Northern Ireland conflict is therefore not only an example of the concerns and 
potential influence of Irish-American politicians, but crucially demonstrates the 
successful utility of their lobbying.  This co-ordinated approach between the president 
of the United States and (former) members of Congress would be replicated during 
the peace process and activities of the Clinton administration (Thompson 2001, 191-
215). 
 
References 
Aldous, Richard. 2012. Reagan and Thatcher: The Difficult Relationship.  London.  
Hutchinson. 
Aughey, Arthur and Cathy Gormley-Heenan eds. 2011. The Anglo-Irish Agreement:  
Rethinking its Legacy.  Manchester.  Manchester University Press.  
Bew, Paul. 2007.  Ireland: The Politics of Enmity 1789-2006. Oxford. Oxford University 
Press. 
---- 2011. ‘Irish government and the agreement:  A dynamic vehicle for change?’ in Arthur 
Aughey and Cathy Gormley-Heenan eds. The Anglo-Irish Agreement:  Rethinking its 
Legacy.  Manchester.  Manchester University Press. 
Cannon, Lou. 2000.  President Reagan: The Role of a Lifetime. New York. Public Affairs. 
Cochrane,  Feargal. 2001.  Unionist Politics and the politics of unionism since the Anglo-Irish 
Agreement. Cork: Cork University Press. 
 42 
Cooper, James. 2012. Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan: A Very Political Special 
Relationship. Basingstoke. Palgrave. 
DeConde, Alexander. 1992. Ethnicity, Race, and American Foreign Policy.  Boston, Mass.; 
Northeastern University Press. 
Dixon, Paul. 2009. Northern Ireland:  The Politics of War and Peace.  Basingstoke. Palgrave.  
Dumbrell, John.  2006.  A Special Relationship: Anglo-American relations from the Cold War 
to Iraq. Basingstoke. Palgrave.   
Farrell, John A. 2001. Tip O’Neill and the Democratic Century. London. Little Brown, and 
company. 
Galloway, George B. 1955. The Legislative Process in Congress.  New York, NY. Thomas Y. 
Crowell. 
Green, Matthew N. 2010. The Speaker of the House: A Study of Leadership. London. Yale 
University Press. 
Guelke, Adrian. 1984. ‘The American Connection to the Northern Ireland Conflict.’ Irish 
Studies in International Affairs 1:4: 27-39.  
---- 1996. ‘The United States, Irish Americans and the Northern Ireland Peace Process.’ 
International Affairs, 72:3:  521-536.  
Hennessey, Thomas. 2000. The Northern Ireland Peace Process: Ending the Troubles?.  
Dublin. Gill and Macmillan. 
Lindsay, James M. 2012.  ‘The Shifting Pendulum of Power:  Executive-Legislation Relations 
on Foreign Policy,’ in James M. McCormick, ed. The Domestic Sources of American 
Foreign Policy. Lanham.  Rowman & Littlechild Publishers, Inc.  
McCormick, James M. ed. 2012. The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy. Lanham. 
Rowman & Littlechild Publishers, Inc.  
Schaller, Michael. 2011.  Ronald Reagan. Oxford. Oxford University Press. 
 43 
Smith, Tony. 2000. Foreign Attachments: The Power of Ethnic Groups in the Making of 
American Foreign Policy. Cambridge, Mass. Harvard University Press. 
Willentz, Sean. 2008. The Age of Reagan:  A History, 1974-2008. New York, NY. 
HarperCollins, 2008.   
Wilson, Andrew J. 1995. Irish America and the Ulster Conflict 1968-1995. Belfast. The 
Blackstaff Press. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
   
 44 
 
                                                        
1 For an introduction to the vast historiography about the ‘Troubles’, see, for instance: Bew 
2007, 486-555.  
2 For Jimmy Carter’s human rights foreign policy, see, for instance:  Willentz 2008, 99-126.  
Similarly, for Ronald Reagan, see, for instance:  Schaller 2011, 59-86. 
3 Jimmy Carter: "Northern Ireland Statement on U.S. Policy.," August 30, 1977. Online by 
Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=8014 [The next series of quotations are from this 
source.] 
4 Ibid. 
5 The Bennett Report followed an investigation into the mistreatment of suspected members 
of the IRA in Northern Ireland interrogation centres. 
6 Copy of press released enclosed with: letter, JS Wall (Private Secretary, Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office) to BG Cartledge (10 Downing Street), 11 April 1979, in The National 
Archives (hereafter PRO), PREM 16/2291, The PM agreed to see Speaker O’Neill of the 
American House of Representatives March 1979. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid. 
9 ‘Visit of Speaker O’Neill and Party to London, April 11-14, 1979’, in PRO, PREM 16/2291, 
The PM agreed to see Speaker O’Neill of the American House of Representatives March 
1979. 
10 News report, ‘Can’t Find Your Elected Representative?  Try China,’ Los Angeles Times, 13 
April 1979, B22. 
11 Staff Files, Kirk O’Donnell Files, Belgium, Great Britain, Hungary, Ireland Visit, 
Arrangements and Security, Nov. 1978 – April 1979, Thomas P. O’Neill, Jr. Congressional 
Papers (CA2009-01), Box 15, Folder 15/14, John J. Burns Library, Boston College (hereafter 
O’Neill Papers). 
 45 
                                                                                                                                                              
12 Press Release, The Speaker’s Rooms, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C. 
20515, April 5, 1979, Box 15, Folder 15/14, O’Neil Papers.   
13 The Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, Washington, MEMORANDUM FOR 
THE SPEAKER, From: Robert S. Strauss, Subject: Review of MTN Status for your European 
Visit, Kirk O’Donnell Files, Belgium, Great Britain, Hungary, Ireland Visit – Background, 
Jan. 1978, April 1979, Box 15, Folder 15, O’Neill Papers.   
14 Reference Papers, Department of State, April 1979, Box 15, Folder 15/14, O’Neill Papers. 
15 Ibid.  
16 Letter, M Turner (Private Secretary, Foreign and Commonwealth Office) to JDF Holt 
(Private Secretary, 10 Downing Street), 5 April 1979, in PRO, PREM 16/2291, The PM 
agreed to see Speaker O’Neill of the American House of Representatives March 1979. 
17 Ibid. 
18 PRO, PREM 16/2291, The PM agreed to see Speaker O’Neill of the American House of 
Representatives March 1979. 
19 ‘Lines to take, Northern Ireland’, author unknown, PRO, PREM 16/2291, The PM agreed 
to see Speaker O’Neill of the American House of Representatives March 1979. 
20 Ibid. (The increase in parliamentary representation for Northern Ireland in 1979 followed 
the ending of devolved government in 1973.) 
21 Report on the fact-finding mission to The United Kingdom, Belgium, Hungary and Ireland, 
April 11-23, 1979, Submitted by Thomas P. O’Neill, Jr. Speaker of the U.S. House of 
Representatives, Kirk O’Donnell Files, Belgium, Great Britain, Hungary, Ireland Visit, 
Report, April 1979, Box 15, Folder 15/16, O’Neill Papers. (The recipient of the report is 
unclear from the documents, but presumably it was for colleagues in the legislative and 
executive branch.)   
22 Ibid. 
23 Letter/Minutes, B.G. Cartledge (Private Secretary, 10 Downing Street) to J.S. Wall (Private 
Secretary, Foreign and Commonwealth Office), Speaker O’Neill’s Call on the Prime Minister 
 46 
                                                                                                                                                              
at 10 Downing Street, 12 April 1979, PRO, PREM 16/2291, The PM agreed to see Speaker 
O’Neill of the American House of Representatives March 1979.  [The following notes are 
from this source.] 
24 Ibid. 
25 Report on the fact-finding mission to The United Kingdom, Belgium, Hungary and Ireland, 
April 11-23, 1979, Submitted by Thomas P. O’Neill, Jr. Speaker of the U.S. House of 
Representatives, Kirk O’Donnell Files, Belgium, Great Britain, Hungary, Ireland Visit, 
Report, April 1979, Box 15, Folder 15/16, O’Neill Papers.   
26 Ibid. 
27 Report on the fact-finding mission to The United Kingdom, Belgium, Hungary and Ireland, 
April 11-23, 1979, Submitted by Thomas P. O’Neill, Jr. Speaker of the U.S. House of 
Representatives, Kirk O’Donnell Files, Belgium, Great Britain, Hungary, Ireland Visit, 
Report, April 1979, Box 15, Folder 15/16, O’Neill Papers.   
28 Ibid. 
29 ‘Visit by Speaker O’Neill,’ 26 April 1979, memorandum of conversation, National 
Archives of Ireland (NAI): Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), 2009/93/20 (hereafter NAI: 
DFA).  I am grateful to the National Archives of Ireland and the Director of the National 
Archives of Ireland for the use of this, and similar, material. 
30 Ibid. 
31 ‘Visit of U.S. Congressional Delegation,’ NAI: DFA Public Records 2009/93/20.   
32 ‘Visit of U.S. Congressional Delegation April, 1979, Steering Note, Northern Ireland’, 
NAI: DFA, 2009/93/20.   
33 Report on the fact-finding mission to The United Kingdom, Belgium, Hungary and Ireland, 
April 11-23, 1979, Submitted by Thomas P. O’Neill, Jr. Speaker of the U.S. House of 
Representatives, Kirk O’Donnell Files, Belgium, Great Britain, Hungary, Ireland Visit, 
Report, April 1979, Box 15, Folder 15/16, O’Neill Papers. 
 47 
                                                                                                                                                              
34 Speaker Thomas P. O’Neill, Jr., Toast remarks, April 19, 1979, delivered in Dublin, Kirk 
O’Donnell Files, Ireland – Speakers 1979 Trip to Ireland, Dublin Castle Speech, April 19th, 
Box 23, Folder 23/9, O’Neill papers. 
35 Ibid.   
36 Speech by the Taoiseach, Mr. J. Lynch, T.D. at the dinner for Speaker and Mrs. O’Neill 
and American Congressmen, Dublin Castle, 19th April, 1979, at 10.00 p.m., Box 23, Folder 
23/9. O’Neill Papers.   
37 Margaret Thatcher, General Election Press Conference, Friday 20 April 1979, accessed via 
http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/104029, 23 January 2013.   
38 Ibid. 
39 Anne McHardy and Philip Jordan, ‘Belfast welcome for Kennedy ally’, The Guardian, 21 
April 1979, 1. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Editorial, ‘Tip O’Neill and the Irish iceberg,’ The Guardian, 21 April 1979, 8.   
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Daily Express Opinion, ‘Go home Mr O’Neill,’ Daily Express, Saturday 21 April 1979, 8. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Editorial, ‘Ruffling the lion’s mane,’ Boston Globe, 25 April 1979, 14. 
47 Ibid.  For Carey’s call for sanctions see: Wilson 1995, 157. 
48 Mary Holland, ‘Tip O’Neill was shocked by Callaghan,’ Sunday Independent, 22 April 
1979, NAI: DFA, 2009/93/20. 
49 Ibid.   
50 Report on the fact-finding mission to The United Kingdom, Belgium, Hungary and Ireland, 
April 11-23, 1979, Submitted by Thomas P. O’Neill, Jr. Speaker of the U.S. House of 
Representatives, Kirk O’Donnell Files, Belgium, Great Britain, Hungary, Ireland Visit, 
Report, April 1979, Box 15, 15/16, O’Neill Papers. 
 48 
                                                                                                                                                              
51 McHardy and Jordan, ‘Belfast welcome for Kennedy ally’, 1. 
52 Report on the fact-finding mission to The United Kingdom, Belgium, Hungary and Ireland, 
April 11-23, 1979, Submitted by Thomas P. O’Neill, Jr. Speaker of the U.S. House of 
Representatives, Kirk O’Donnell Files, Belgium, Great Britain, Hungary, Ireland Visit, 
Report, April 1979, Box 15, 15/16, O’Neill Papers. 
53 James Kelly, ‘Carter set for North Summit’, Irish Independent, 21 April 1979, NAI: DFA, 
2009/93/20. 
54 Kenneth Clarke, ‘O’Neill’s trail of rumour,’ The Sunday Telegraph, 22 April 1979, NAI: 
DFA, 2009/93/20. 
55 Rachelle Patterson ‘O’Neill: Irish trip beneficial,’ Boston Globe, 22 April 1979, 1. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Memorandum, Alexander M. Haig, Jr. to Ronald Reagan, Visit of Prime Minister Thatcher, 
[Briefing book re visit of British Prime Minister Thatcher, February 25-28, 1981] (Binder) 
(1/2) Box 91434 (RAC 1), Executive Secretariat, NSC: VIP Visits, Ronald Reagan Library.   
58 Ronald Reagan: "Statement on St. Patrick's Day ," March 17, 1981. Online by Gerhard 
Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=43547, accessed 31 July 2013. 
59 ‘Meeting with Judge William P Clark, National Security Adviser, at the White House, 4 
October, 1982,’ Visit of Mr Gerard Collins, Minister for Foreign Affairs, To Washington, 
September – October 1982, Visits abroad by Minister for Foreign Affairs, November 1981 – 
December 1982, NAI: DFA, 2012/59/1581. 
60 Margaret Thatcher, Press Conference following Anglo-Irish Summit, Monday 19 
November 1984, http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/105790, accessed 31 July 2013.    
61 Ibid.      
62 For the ‘special relationship’ between Reagan and Thatcher, see, for instance: Aldous 2012 
and Cooper 2012). 
63 See, for instance:  Cannon 2000, 424-87. 
 49 
                                                                                                                                                              
64 Memorandum for: The President, From: George P. Shultz, Subject: Your Trip to Ireland: 
Setting and Issues, The President’s Trip to Europe: Ireland, UK and Normandy (1 of 6) Box 
20, 06/01/1984 – 06/10/1984 (Binder), Office of Coordination, NSC: Records, Ronald 
Reagan Library.  
65 Memorandum for: The President, From: George P. Shultz, Subject: Your Trip to the United 
Kingdom: Setting and Issues, May 14, 1984, The President’s Trip to Europe: Ireland, UK and 
Normandy (1 of 6) Box 20, 06/01/1984 – 06/10/1984 (Binder), Office of Coordination, NSC: 
Records, Ronald Reagan Library. 
66 Letter, Thomas P. O’Neill to Ronald Reagan, December 13, 1984, 8434471, Congressional 
Correspondence by member (L-Z), Box 90520, Chris Lehman, Files (4/18) [0], Ronald 
Reagan Library. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Letter, Mario Biaggi et al to Ronald Reagan, December 17, 1984, 834470, Congressional 
Correspondence by member (L-Z), Box 90520, Chris Lehman, Files (4/18) [0], Ronald 
Reagan Library. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Letter, Thomas P. O’Neill, Jr. et al to Ronald Reagan, December 20, 1984, Thatcher Visit – 
Dec 84 [3], Box 90902, European and Soviet Affairs Directorate, NSC: Records, Ronald 
Reagan Library. 
71 Memorandum of Conversation, Subject:  Meeting with British Prime Minister Margaret 
Thatcher, Participants:  The President, The Vice President, Secretary Shultz, Robert C. 
McFarlane, Ambassador Price, Assistant Secretary Burt, Peter R. Sommer, NSC, Mrs. 
Thatcher, Ambassador Wright, Robin Butler, Principal Private Secretary to Mrs. Thatcher, 
Charles Powell, Private Secretary to Mrs. Thatcher, Date, Time and Place:  December 22, 
1984, Camp David, 10: 40 a.m. – 11: 10 a.m., Private Meeting, Aspen Lodge, 11:30 a.m. – 
1:25 p.m., Expanded Meeting and Lunch, Laurel Lodge,  December 28, 1984, Thatcher Visit, 
 50 
                                                                                                                                                              
Dec 84 [1], Box 90902, European and Soviet Affairs Directorate, NSC: Records, Ronald 
Reagan Library.   
72 Ibid. 
73 Letter, Ronald Reagan to Thomas P. O’Neill, January 9, 1985, Congressional 
Correspondence by member (L-Z), Box 90520, Lehman, Chris Files (4/18) [0], Box 3, Ronald 
Reagan Library. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Alex Brummer, ‘The greening of the White House,’ The Guardian, Tuesday 26 November 
1985, 21. 
76 Margaret Thatcher, Speech to Joint Houses of Congress, Wednesday 20 February 1985, 
accessed via http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/105968, 1 August 2013.   
77 Brummer, ‘The greening of the White House,’ 21. 
78 Ibid. 
79 For the Anglo-Irish Agreement, see, for instance: Hennessey 2000 and Cochrane 2001. 
80 ‘Meeting with House Speaker Tip O’Neill, Date: November 15, 1985, Location: Oval 
Office and Press Room, Time: 10:00-10:15 a.m., From: Robert C. McFarlane/M.B. Oglesby, 
Jr., Meeting with Tip O’Neill & Irish & UK Ambassadors 11/15/85, Box 10, Coordination 
Office, National Security Counsel: Records, Ronald Reagan Library. [Subsequent quotes are 
also from this source.] 
81 Ibid.  
82 Ronald Reagan, Statement on the United Kingdom-Ireland Agreement Concerning 
Northern Ireland, November 15, 1985, accessed via 
http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1985/111585a.htm, 1 August 2013.  
83 Statement by Speaker Thomas P. O’Neill, Jr., November 15, 1985, Kirk O’Donnell Files, 
Ireland:  Anglo-Irish Agreement, 1985, 25/6, Thomas P. O’Neill Papers, Staff Files: Kirk 
O’Donnell Files, Box 25, John J. Burns Library, Boston College. 
 51 
                                                                                                                                                              
84 Ronald Reagan and Thomas P. O’Neill, Remarks on the United Kingdom-Ireland 
Agreement Concerning Northern Ireland, November 15, 1985, accessed via 
http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1985/111585b.htm, 1 August 2013.   
85 Floor Remarks of Speaker Thomas P. O’Neill, Jr., March 11, 1986, Subject File, Box 13, 
Ireland 1986, 13/8, O’Neill Papers. 
86 Ibid. 
87 See: http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/aia/chron.htm.  Unfortunately the package was delayed 
due to debates about a new extradition treaty between UK and US.  Ultimately, the American 
contribution to the International Fund for Ireland was passed at $120 million – over three 
years – in July 1986.  See:  Wilson 1995, 254-56.     
